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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
DOUGLAS MCKAY, JR.*
The several decisions reviewed in this paper reflect no startling
departures from established law. Some of the cases reviewed here-
inafter are unusual in their facts or in the application of law to
those facts.
As in the past, this paper is rather loosely arranged in three main
parts: Remedies, Trial, and Review. Under Renedies, I have in-
cluded decisions on Comity between State and Federal Courts; De-
claratory Judgment; Remedies for Fraud; Action against Statutory
Insurer; and Service of Process. Under Trials are cases on Dis-
covery; Instructions to Jury; Liability for Costs; Re-opening Judg-
ment; Venue; and Voluntary Non-suit. Under Review are cases on
Appealability of Orders; Additional Sustaining Grounds; Excep-
tions; Review of Damages; Review of Findings of Lower Court;
Review where Objections not Timely made; Review of Points not
Raised Below; and Waiver of Objection.
REMEDIES
Comity
Sparrow v. Nerzig1 involves comity between the State and Feder-
al Courts. In this case plaintiff sued defendant, a resident of New
York, in the State Court for damage to plaintiff's truck from a
collision with defendant's automobile. Defendant counterclaimed.
Defendant's son, Stuart, then brought suit in the United States
District Court against the plaintiff herein and his truck driver for
personal injuries received in the wreck, to which suit answer was
filed, but no counterclaim.
Thereafter plaintiff herein moved to amend his action in the State
Court to make Stuart a party defendant to assert a claim against
him, and recover judgment against him and his father. The lower
Court granted the motion and defendants appealed.
The Supreme Court ruled that Rule 13(a), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, had been amended in 1946 to prevent a party, required
by that rule to file a compulsory counterclaim, from avoiding the
rule by separate proceeding in another court. It stated that although
the State Court had jurisdiction to allow the joinder of Stuart, that
nevertheless:
*Member ,of the firm of McKay, McKay, Black & Walker.
1. Sparrow v. Nerzig, 228 S.C. 277,89 S.E. 2d 718 (1955).
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The existence of jurisdiction does not mean that it must be ex-
ercised and that grounds may not be shown for staying the hand
of the Court I......
The action originally instituted by Respondent in the Court of
Common Pleas for Dillon County was against Milton Nerzig
alone. Stuart Nerzig was in no sense a necessary party for
the determination of that controversy; his joinder involved a
wholly new cause of action, the subject of which was already
in litigation in the District Court of the United States.......
The Courts of our State are under no compulsion to defer to
the Federal jurisdiction in cases such as the present. The Fed-
eral Courts in this State were under no compulsion to stay their
hand in .. . . (Certain cases cited)
But as in the cases last mentioned the xercise of the Federal
jurisdiction would have disturbed the normal and adequate pro-
cesses of litigation already pending in the State Courts, so in
the case at bar would the assumption of jurisdiction by our
Court of a cause of action essentially the subject of a compul-
sory counterclaim in the pending Federal action unnecessarily
hinder the jurisdiction of the District Court and effectually de-
feat the purpose of its rule of procedure before mentioned. Such
a course is inconsistent with that 'spirit of reciprocal comity
and mutual assistance' required for the effective operation of
our two systems of Courts.
The court did not reverse the lower court's order, but remanded
the case with directions that the proceeding against Stuart Nerzig
be abated and stayed pending final determination of the action in
the Federal Court.
Declaratory Judgment
Dantzder v. Callison2 involved a complaint by naturopaths seek-
ing a declaratory judgment construing the State statutes relating to
Naturopathic Physicians so as to allow them to administer and pre-
scribe certain narcotic and other drugs. The State Attorney Gener-
al demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not set out
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the Supreme
Court held:
It is well settled that where the complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment sets forth a justiciable controversy, it is not subject
to demurrer on the ground that it fails to state a cause of ac-
2. Dantzler v. Callison, 227 S.C. 317, 88 S.E. 2d 64 (1955).
[Vol. 9
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss1/17
SURVEY o SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
tion ....... .In passing on a demurrer in such cases, the
Court is not concerned with whether the plaintiff is right in
the controversy, but is only concerned with whether he is en-
titled to a declaration of rights with respect to the matters
alleged.
Remedies for Fraud
In Turner v. Carey3 the Supreme Court held that several remedies
are available to a purchaser of land who is induced to enter into a
contract of purchase by fraudulent representations of the seller.
He may, despite the fraud, elect to affirm the contract, retain
the property received under it, and bring an action at law for
fraud and deceit against the vendor to recover the damages sus-
tained by reason of the fraud or misrepresentation, or, if sued
for the agreed price, set-off or recoup the damages resulting
from the fraud ....... .Instead of bringing an action for
damages, the defrauded purchaser may rescind the sale and re-
cover the consideration paid. Rescission for fraud may be as-
serted as a defense to an action by the vendor for the purchase
money or damages .......
The two actions are inconsistent, the one being based on the
continued existence of the sale, and the other on its abrogation,
and the purchaser cannot in the one form of action secure the
relief appropriate to the other ........
Action Against Statutory .Insurer
In Dobson v. Anerican Indemnity Co.4 plaintiff sued the Statu-
tory Insurer of a public motor carrier licensed by the Public Service
Commission. In the complaint plaintiff set out the full amount of
coverage afforded by the insurer which was in excess of that re-
quired by the Public Service Commission. The lower court struck
the allegations as to full coverage, and its holding was affirmed by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that ordinarily the
fact that defendant is protected by liability insurance should not be
made known to the jury. However, in cases where liability in-
surance is required by law, the amount thus required may be made
known, but all in excess of the required amount is private insurance
and may not be made known.
3. Turner v. Carey, 227 S.C. 298, 87 S.E. 2d 871 (1955), see also Edens v.
City of Columbia, 228 S. C. 563, 91 S.E. 2d 280 (1955).
4. Dobson v. American Indemnity Co., 227 S.C. 307, 87 S.E. 2d 869 (1955).
1956]
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Service and Process
In H. S. Chisholm, Inc. v. Klinger5 the proceeding was commenced
by service of a rule to show cause instead of a summons. Certain
defendants moved to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that
action should have been commenced by service of a summons. The
Supreme Court ruled that although the Code provides that action
shall be commenced by service of a Summons, nevertheless, where
the rule to show cause complies substantially with the prerequisites
for a summons, its use rather than a summons will be excused.
"While this order was not 'subscribed by the plaintiff or his at-
torney' surely a notice and a command issued by the Court itself
should be as efficacious as one issued by the party to an action or
his attorney ...... ".
Sturgeon v. Thornton6 had occasion to consider who was em-
powered to make service of process on an inmate of the penitentiary.
Service in this case was made by a special Deputy Sheriff who had
been thus appointed by the Sheriff of Richland County, rather than
by that Worthy, himself, or the Superintendent of the penitentiary.
Appellant objected that he was not properly served, but the Supreme
Court held that Sections 10436 and 53-83, CODIF OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952, must be construed together. Although the former
section provides that service upon inmates of certain institutions
shall be made by the Sheriff or by the Superintendent of the institu-
tion, the latter section empowers Special Deputies appointed by the
Sheriff to make "service of process in civil and criminal proceed-
ings only", so that the Special Deputy's service in this case was held
proper.
Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company7 is of consider-
able interest and concern to insurance companies and other non-resi-
dents who are served by substituted service of process, since it de-
termines when the time for answering begins to run. In this case
service of process was made on the State Insurance Commissioner
as agent for the defendant, and he in turn forwarded the summons
and complaint to defendant at its Jacksonville office where it was
received a day or so later. Twenty-one days after service on the
Insurance Commissioner the defendant tendered its answer to plain-
tiff's attorney who declined to accept it. The lower court refused
to extend the time so as to allow defendant to answer. On appeal
5. H. S. Chisholm, Inc. v. Klinger, 229 S.C. 8, 91 S.E. 2d 538 (1955).
6. Sturgeon v. Thornton, 227 S.C. 294, 87 S.E. 2d 821 (1955).
7. Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 229 S.C. 44, 91 S.E. 2d 723
(1956).
[Vol. 9
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the Supreme Court held that the time for answering began to run
from the day the process was served on the Insurance Commissioner
rather than from the day it was received by the defendant at its
home office. Also, on the appeal, the Supreme Court declined to
decide or consider the applicability of the Code section allowing
double time where service is by mail on the ground that this point
had not been presented to the lower court.
Discovery
In Ellen v. King8 the Supreme Court held that the Code Section9
providing for pre-trial examination of an adverse party did not al-
low it as a matter of right, but rather that such examination could
only be conducted by leave of court for good cause shown. The
court held that allowance of the right lay within the sound judicial
discretion of the court, and rejected the argument of the defendant-
appellant that a 1923 amendment to the statute requiring that the
moving party obtain leave of court before examining his adversary
applied only when the adversary resided in another county.
However, in Stepp v. Horton,10 the Supreme Court held that the
trial Judge properly exercised his discretion in allowing the plain-
tiff to examine defendant's claim agent in advance of trial to ascer-
tain whether or not one of the individual co-defendants was an agent
of the corporate defendants, which the court held was essential to
the plaintiff's proof of his case.
Instructions to the Jury
In Swindler v. Peay" the defendant, sued for running over plain-
tiff's cow, counterclaimed and was awarded damages for injuries
to his automobile. Plaintiff on appeal sought a new trial because
the trial Judge had refused certain of his requests to charge and
also because the Judge had charged a penal statute in a civil case.
The Supreme Court held that the requested instructions had been
covered in substance in the trial Judge's general charge, and, "it is
not error for the Court to refuse requests to charge, even when they
contain correct and applicable statements of the law, if their sub-
stance is fairly covered in the instructions given."
The court answered plaintiff's objection to the charge on the crimi-
nal statute, "The rule that the violation of a statute is negligence per
se is, by its very nature, especially applicable to statutes imposing
8. Ellen v. King, 227 S.C. 481,88 S.E. 2d 598 (1955).
9. CODE or LAWS Or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-501.
10. Stepp v. Horton, 227 S.C. 432, 88 S.E. 2d 258 (1955).
11. Swindler v. Peay, 227 S.C. 157, 87 S.E. 296 (1955).
1956]
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upon persons specific duties for the protection of others, and conse-
quently penal in character."
In Wright v. Harris12 the Supreme Court granted defendant a
new trial on the ground that the lower court erred in instructing the
jury on the law relating to breach of contract with intent to defraud
accompanied by fraudulent acts in an action for fraud and deceit.
The court said that it was reversible error for the lower court to
charge a correct principle of law as governing a case when such
principle was inapplicable to the issues on trial. "Conflicting and ir-
revelant instructions constitute reversible error and a trial Judge
ought to take care not to confuse the jury by charging on legal
principles which are inapplicable to the case on trial."
In Sample v. Reserve Life Insurance Company'8 the Supreme
Court granted a new trial to the defendant insurance company sued
on its policy because the trial Judge had instructed the jury that a
provision of the policy that to receive benefits the insured must be
under a doctor's care was "ineffective as a matter of law". The
court said, "The language used in this portion of the policy is plain
and unambiguous, and to us it is a valid portion of the contract of
insurance and is as effective as any other portion of the contract."
The court declined to consider this same provision as a ground that
the trial Judge erred in refusing to direct a verdict because this point
had not been presented to the trial Judge as such a ground.
In Jackson v. Solomon1 4 the Supreme Court held that the lower
court did not err in denying appellant's verbal request that the
Judge charge the doctrine of last clear chance, made for the first time
when the Judge had completed his charge, excused the jury, and
asked for exception to the charge. The Supreme Court held that
the last clear chance doctrine had to be pleaded affirmatively, but had
not been. Appellant was therefore not entitled to any charge thereon
even assuming (which it did not decide) that such a defense was
ever available to a defendant.
In Brown v. Hill 5 the Supreme Court overruled appellant's ex-
ception that the trial Judge erroneously failed to charge the pleaded
defense of "negligence of a third party", on the ground that the de-
fendant had not requested the trial Judge to charge that defense
when given the opportunity to do so. The trial Judge had recalled
12. Wright v. Harris, 228 S.C. 144, 89 S.E. 2d 97 (1955).
13. Sample v. Reserve Life Insurance Co., 227 S.C. 206, 87 S.E. 2d 476
(1955).
14. Jackson v. Solomon, 228 S.C. 225, 89 S.E. 2d 436 (1955).
15. Brown v. Hill, 228 S.C. 34, 88 S.E. 2d 838 (1955).
[Vol. 9
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the jury and charged them on "unavoidable accident". The Supreme
Court said:
If counsel conceived that by such reference to the fourth de-
fense the trial Judge had incorrectly stated the issue, he should
have called the Judge's attention to such misstatement; if he had
desired a more detailed charge or further instruction with re-
gard to the fourth defense, he should have requested it. Having
done neither, he cannot now complain.
Liability for Costs
In South Orange Trust Company v. Connor16 plaintiff sought
foreclosure of a second mortgage which it claimed it held as an in-
nocent purchaser for value. The referee and Circuit Judge found
that the plaintiff was not an innocent purchaser. Although they
allowed judgment in favor of the plaintiff, they taxed all costs against
plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court held:
Liability for costs in the Circuit Court in equity cases is general-
ly controlled by the decision of the Circuit Judge, and the exer-
cise of his discretion in such matters will not be interfered with
except for clear abuse of discretion or for violation of some
principle of law. The ordinary rule that costs must be taxed
in favor of the prevailing party against the losing party, Sec-
tion 10-1601 South Carolina Code of Laws of 1952, is not
necessarily binding on the Chancellor and is only effective in
equity cases when not otherwise ordered by the Court.
Re-opening Judgmuent17
In Royal Liverpool Insurance Group v. McCarthy's plaintiff had
recovered judgment by default against an automobile dealer in an
action for conversion of an automobile, and the defendant applied
to the court to re-open the judgment. The application was granted
by the lower court apparently on grounds of excusable neglect. The
Supreme Court on appeal reversed the lower court and re-established
16. South Orange Trust Co. v. Connor, 228 S.C. 218, 89 S.E. 2d 372 (1955).
17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1213, provides: "The
court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as may be just, at any time
within one year after notice thereof relieve a party from a judgment, order,
or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in any form in any re-
spect to the provisions of this Code the court may, in like manner and upon like
terms, permit an amendment of such proceeding so as to make it conformable
thereto."
18. Royal Liverpool Insurance Group v. McCarthy, 229 S.C. 72, 91 S.E. 2d
881 (1956).
1956]
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the judgment on the ground that one of the prerequisites to the re-
opening of a judgment is that the defendant must show at least prima
facie that he has a meritorious defense. The court held that since
the defendant had failed to make such a showing the lower court
erred as a matter of law in allowing defendant to re-open.
In Weathers v. Gary19 plaintiff sued for damages on the ground
that defendant had sold plaintiff an ice-making machine which
was unsatisfactory for the purpose. Summons and complaint were
served April 15, 1953, defendant made no answer, and plaintiff was
granted judgment by default June 26, 1953. Thereafter, the manu-
facturer of the ice-making machine, not a party to the proceedings,
furnished plaintiff with a new ice-making machine which apparently
also failed to give satisfaction. In January of 1954 plaintiff turned
his judgment against defendant over to the Sheriff for execution.
Subsequently, the Sheriff made a return nulla bona. On June 19,
1954, plaintiff secured an order for supplemental proceedings against
the defendant on the judgment setting the hearing thereon for Au-
gust 11, 1954. The hearing was continued, but on August 16, 1954,
defendant notified plaintiff that he would move to set aside the judg-
ment, re-open the case, file answer, and go to trial on merits. De-
fendant's motion to re-open was granted whereupon plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court saying:
When a man has a case in Court the best thing he can do is
attend to it with the amount of attention a man of ordinary pru-
dence usually gives his important business ......... When
the judgment was enrolled, knowledge thereof was imputed to
defendant, and such adjudication ought not to be lightly set
aside, and it cannot be set aside unless the method provided by
Code Section 10-1213 is strictly followed. An essential provision
of this section is to apply for relief within one year. (Emphasis)
Among the reasons given by the lower court for allowing the de-
fendant in the above case to re-open was that plaintiff's acceptance
of the second ice-making machine from the manufacturer in place
of the first ice-making machine created in effect a novation between
plaintiff and defendant. This was strongly criticized by the Supreme
Court which said, "It was error for the Court to grant defendant
relief which he neither sought nor was entitled to under his motion."
Again in Antrum v. Hartsville Production Credit Association20
the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court denying
19. Weathers v. Gary, 228 S.C. 105, 88 S.E. 2d 871 (1955).
20. Antrum v. Hartsville Production Credit Association, 228 S.C. 201, 89 S.E.
2d 376 (1955).
[Vol. 9
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss1/17
SURVIY OV SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
defendant the right to re-open and have set aside a foreclosure sale
and have the deed to the purchaser cancelled when plaintiff's petition
therefor was filed four years after the original decree in foreclosure.
Venue
In Witherspoon v. Spoits and Co.21 an action for death was
brought in Clarendon County against Hunter, a resident of Lan-
caster County, and Sharpe Construction Company of Clarendon
County. Hunter moved to change the venue to the County of his
residence, contending that Sharpe was an immaterial defendant
joined only to retain venue in Clarendon County. The lower court
found as a fact that Sharpe was an immaterial defendant and or-
dered venue changed to Lancaster County. Plaintiff appealed this
order on the ground that Hunter, having answered generally before
moving to change venue, had waived his right to do so. The Su-
preme Court overruled this contention to follow its prior decision
in Brown v. Palmetto Baking Company,22 "That answer in an action
does not constitute waiver of the right to remove a case to the proper
County for trial." The court also held that the lower court's find-
ings that Sharpe was an immaterial defendant would not be disturbed
on appeal absent manifest error.
In Simmons v. Cohen23 plaintiff sued three defendants, one a
resident of New York, one a resident of Charleston County and
one a resident of Colleton County, for an automobile collision which
occurred in Charleston County, some thirty-one miles from the
Charleston County Court House and seventeen miles from the Colle-
ton County Court House. The Colleton defendant moved before the
lower court to change the place of trial to the county of his resi-
dence on the ground that this would tend to promote the ends of
justice and the convenience of witnesses, and also on the ground
that the Charleston defendant was joined solely for the purpose of
retaining venue in Charleston County. The trial Judge overruled
the motion on the grounds that convenience of witnesses, etc.,
would be better served by retaining venue in Charleston County, and
the Supreme Court, on appeal, held that the trial Judge had proper-
ly exercised his discretion and that his ruling would not be upset
unless the appellant showed that the court had committed a manifest
abuse of sound judicial discretion, which the appellant had not shown.
21. Witherspoon v. Spotts and Co., 227 S.C. 209, 87 S.E. 2d 477 (1955).
22. Brown v. Palmetto Baking Co., 220 S.C. 38, 66 S.E. 2d 417 (1951).
23. Simmons v. Cohen, 227 S.C. 606, 88 S.E. 2d 679 (1955).
1956]
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Beard v. Billups Petroleum Co.2 4 is an interesting decision on what
will, or will not, "promote the ends of justice" as that ground is
included in the venue statute. This suit, for malicious prosecu-
tion, was originally brought in Richland County for a cause of action
which arose in Aiken County, in which latter County all of the pro-
posed witnesses save one non-resident of this State resided. The
lower court denied the Motion to change the venue to Aiken Coun-
ty on grounds that a speedier trial could be had in Richland County
which would tend to "promote the ends of justice". The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court holding that although rulings of the
trial court on questions of venue ordinarily lie within that court's
sound judicial discretion and thus will be reversed only for manifest
error, nevertheless, the prospect of a speedier trial in Richland
County did not outweight the showing that the convenience of wit-
nesses in this case would have been better served by a trial in Aiken
County. The court also adverted to the rule that it was desirable
that a jury of the vicinage pass upon the creditability of witnesses,
all but one of whom resided in Aiken County.
In Holden v. Beach25 a resident of Kershaw County brought suit
in that County for injuries received on a carnival ride at Myrtle
Beach, in Horry County, against the defendant who resided in the
latter County. The defendant moved for, and was granted, a change
of venue from Kershaw County to Horry County on the grounds
that the accident and the ride which caused it were in Horry County
and trial in that County would serve the convenience of witnesses
and promote the ends of justice. The lower court granted the
motion and was sustained by the Supreme Court which held that
trial in place of residence was a valuable right of the defendant, and
that although the convenience of plaintiff's witnesses might be better
served by trial in Kershaw County that of defendant's witnesses
would be better served in Horry County. The trial Judge's ruling
thereon did not manifest an abuse of sound discretion, hence would
not be disturbed.
In Melton v. MClton2 6 the plaintiff instituted this proceeding
against his former wife (whom he had already divorced) to have their
marriage annuled on the grounds that she fraudulently concealed
certain facts from him prior to marriage which would have prevented
his marrying her had he known them. Action was brought in Green-
ville County, where the parties had lived as husband and wife, but
24. Beard v. Billups Petroleum Co., 228 S.C. 481, 90 S.E. 2d 685 (1955).
25. Holden v. Beach, 228 S.C. 234, 89 S.E. 2d 433 (1955).
26. Melton v. Melton, 227 S.C. 183, 87 S.E. 2d 485 (1955).
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respondent applied for and was granted a change of venue to An-
derson County, the place of her residence for many years.
The husband appealed, contending that the CODE OB LAWS ov
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, § 10-301, required that the action be tried
in Greenville County because the "subject of the action" (not ex-
plained) lay there. The Supreme Court overruled this contention and
held that the instant proceeding did not fall within those categories
set out in Section 10-301, but rather was controlled by Section 10-303
that "In all other cases the action shall be tried in the County in
which the defendant resides at the time of commencement of the
action.'"
In Packet Delivery Co. v. State Motor Lines2 7 suit was brought in
Charleston County against a domestic motor carrier whose headquar-
ters was in Darlington County, for an accident which occurred in Wil-
liamsburg County. Defendant moved for and was granted a change of
venue from Charleston to Darlington County on the grounds that it
had no place of business, property or agent in Charleston County, and
its principal place of business was in Darlington County. The Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court to return the case to Charles-
ton County, holding that in suits against domestic motor carriers
venue is controlled by COD ov LAWS O SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952,
§ 58-1470 providing: "An action may be brought against a motor
carrier licensed under article three of this chapter in any county
through which the motor carrier operates." The Supreme Court
held that this Code Section supersedes all others relating to venue
so far as domestic motor carriers are concerned.
In Hopkins v. Sun Crest Bottling Co. 2 8 the court had occasion to
consider a different statute affecting the place of suit against ordi-
nary domestic business corporations. Thus the Supreme Court held
that a domestic corporation could not be sued in a County where
it did not transact business and own property under a Code Sec-
tion allowing suit against a domestic corporation and conferring juris-
diction therein "'In any County where such domestic corporations
shall own property and transact business" '29 There apparently
was no question that the defendant bottling company transacted
business in Darlington County, but the case turned on the ques-
tion of whether or not it owned any property in that County. It was
conceded that defendant owned certain empty bottles and crates in
27. Packet Delivery Co. v. State Motor Lines, 228 S.C. 3361 89' S.E. 2d 922
(1955).
28. Hopkins v. Sun Crest Bottling Co., 228 S.C. 287, 89 S.E. 2d 755 (1955).
29. Cone or LAWS oP Sotrta CAROLIA, 1952 § 10-421.
1956]
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the hands of retailers in Darlington County which were picked up
and regularly exchanged from time to time. The court held that
these articles had not such a permanent situs in Darlington County
as would permit suit against the defendant there. "It was never the
intention of the Legislature that property so transitorily in the
County should be considered the ownership of property therein,
within the meaning of Section 10-421."
Voluntary Nonsuit
In Caulder v. Skippera3 the plaintiff before trial in the State
Court moved for voluntary nonsuit without prejudice which was re-
sisted by the defendants and denied by the lower court. Defendants
opposed the granting of the nonsuit on the ground that they were
entitled to a speedy trial since the pending suit was injuring their
business; that one of the defendant's principal witnesses might not
be available at a later date; that the plaintiff was dismissing the
action in the State Court for the purpose of moving to another State
so that he could reinstitute the action in the Federal court which
would deprive certain defendants of the right of trial in their home
County, and finally that certain of the defendants were planning
to sell their business and the sale could not be negotiated until the
suit was disposed of. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court and entered an order of nonsuit without prejudice on the
ground that:
The true rule is that a voluntary nonsuit should be granted
in the absence of a showing of legal prejudice to the de-
fendants, and the discretion of the hearing Judge thereabout
is brought to play only upon a showing that legal prejudice
would result from the granting of the motion for a nonsuit.
The court decided that the objections of the defendant did not
establish "legal prejudice", which was not created merely by the
fact that defendants might be subjected to another suit.
Appealability of Orders
In Smith v. Traxler3l the trial Judge granted a non-suit and
later on application of the plaintiff, set aside his order of non-suit
to grant a new trial on ground that there had been evidence for the
jury's consideration. The defendant appealed from the order grant-
ing the new trial, which plaintiff contended was not appealable.
30. Caulder v. Skipper, 228 S.C. 606, 91 S.E. 2d 321 (1956).
31. Smith v. Traxler, 228 S.C. 418, 90 S.E. 2d482 (1955).
[Vol. 9
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The Supreme Court reversed the order granting a new trial and
re-established the order of non-suit holding:
The Court granted a non-suit upon the legal ground that the
evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of the case to
the jury. It was not granted because of some failure of proof
which might be supplied upon another trial, but upon the
ground that the evidence introduced affirmatively showed plain-
tiff was not entitled to recover. Plaintiff could have appealed
from the order granting this non-suit. If he had, the issue be-
fore this Court on such an appeal would have been whether
there was sufficient evidence to warrant submission of the case
to the jury, which is precisely the question now before us. In-
stead of appealing directly to this Court, plaintiff sought to
remedy the alleged error by a motion for a new trial. The trial
Judge granted this motion because he conceived that error at
law had been committed in granting a non-suit.
The court then held that where the granting or refusal of a new
trial was based solely on an error at law, the order therefor was ap-
pealable, but if it was based upon a question of fact or one of law
and fact, the order would not be appealable. The court held that
when a new trial was granted because the trial Judge believed he
had erroneously granted a non-suit or a direction of verdict, his order
would involve a question of law and would be appealable, and it held
that the facts of this case distinguished it from the earlier decision of
Agnew v. Adams 32 relied upon by defendant.
Additional Sustaining Grounds
In Johnson v. Life Insurance Co~mpany of Georgia3 the cor-
porate defendant had moved for and been granted judgment non
obstante veredicto by the lower court. On appeal it submitted as
additional sustaining grounds for the judgment non obstante vere-
dicto, an objection which it had urged only in support of its alter-
native motion for new trial in which the lower court bad not ruled.
The Supreme Court said:
This contention is not appropriate under Section 7 of Rule 4
as an additional ground 'upon which this Court will be asked
to sustain the rulings or judgment below' for it relates in
fact to the corporate respondents' alternative motion for a
32. Agnew v. Adams, 24 S.C. 86 (1885).
33. Johnson v. Life Insurance Company of Georgia, 227 S.C. 351, 88 S.E.
2d 260 (1955).
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new trial, upon which the lower Court did not rule. We shaU
consider it, therefore, not under the rule, but in relation to
the further proceedings for which the case must be remanded.
Exceptions
Supreme Court Rule No. 4, Section 6,34 provides:
Each exception must contain a concise statement of one propo-
sition of law or fact which this Court is asked to review, and
the same assignment of error should not be repeated. Each
exception must contain within itself a complete assignment of
error, and a mere reference therein to any other exception
then or previously taken or request to charge, will not be con-
sidered. The exceptions should not be long or argumentative in
form.
In all affection I cannot resist the temptation to comment that the
Supreme Court in its application of this rule to cases before it, re-
minds me of a story told on a prominent Columbian, who, when
he was asked if he attended Church regularly, replied "Sometimes."
However, I do not suggest that the practitioner test the leniency of
the court by disregarding this rule-he might "get religion" the
hard way.
The Supreme Court applied Rule 4, Section 6, in Scott v. Inde-
pendent Life & Accident Insurance Company,35 characterizing an
exception as "Entirely too general, vague, and indefinite to be con-
sidered . . ." which charged "His Honor erred, it is respectfully
submitted, in holding that a cause of action had been stated in the
Complaint." The court conceded that on occasion it waived enforce-
ment of the Rule, saying:
In the Brady case"6 we waived the breach of the rule and con-
sidered the exception because it was found to embrace a meri-
torious assignment of error. In some instances, however, we
have absolutely refused to consider exceptions framed in viola-
tion of the rule.
In Brown v. Hill37 appellant's second exception was:
' The Court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion for a
34. COn OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Vol. 7, p. 429.
35. Scott v. Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co., 227 S.C. 535, 88
S.E. 2d 623 (1955).
36. Brady v. Brady, 222 S.C. 242, 72 S.E. 2d 193 (1952).
37. Brown v. Hill, 228 S.C. 34, 88 S.E. 2d 838 (1955).
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new trial on the grounds stated in such motion, it being sub-
mitted:
(a) That it was error to refuse the requests to charge by ap-
pellant No. 6, 8 and 9 as expressly set forth in the mo-
tion by appellant...
(c) That the verdict of the jury was contrary to the evidence
and the law.
The Supreme Court said "this exception does not comply with
the requirements of Rule 5, Section 6 of this Court, and might
for that reason be disregarded . . . We have considered it, how-
ever, and find it without merit." The Court then disposed of
subdivision (a) of this exception on its merits, but said "Sub-
division (c) is too general to be considered."
In Shea v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. 8 the Supreme Court
observed that an exception (not quoted) which charged that the
lower court erred in admitting testimony concerning plaintiff's fi-
nancial status, and in refusing to instruct the jury that such evi-
dence should in no way affect their verdict, violated Rule 4, Section
6, because it stated more than one proposition of law or assignment
of error.
Review of Damages
Johnson v. Life Insurance Company of Georgia39 was a suit for
slander against an insurance company and its agent. When a verdict
was rendered against both defendants for $25,800 actual damages
and $10,000 punitive damages the trial Judge granted judgment not-
withstanding the verdict for the corporate defendant and granted a
new trial to the individual defendant unless plaintiff remitted $8,500
of the verdict for actual damages and all of the verdict for punitive
damages. The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court held that
although it found no error in the trial Judge's ruling as to actual
damages, that he did commit error in requiring plaintiff to remit all
punitive damages where the suit charged slander per se. The cause
was remanded to the lower court for its further consideration of the
excessiveness of both actual and punitive damages, the Supreme
Court saying:
The trial Judge has wide discretionary power to reduce the
amount of a verdict which in his opinion is excessive, and his
judgment, in the exercise of that power, will rarely be dis-
38. Shea v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 228 S.C. 173, 89 S.E. 2d 221 (1955).
39. Johnson v. Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co., 227 S.C. 351, 88
S.E. 2d 260 (1955).
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turbed ......... But this power has its limitations, and
does not extend to striking down in toto a verdict which has
support in the evidence.
Turner v. Carey40 is rather involved in its facts. Plaintiff brought
suit against defendant alleging defendant had fraudulently sold him
a defective house, demanding reimbursement of all sums paid by
plaintiff, including payments on a second mortgage to defendant, and
offering to return the house. Later in another proceeding the holder
of the first mortgage on the house brought foreclosure against plain-
tiff as mortgagor and the present defendant as second mortgagee and
in that proceeding the amounts owed under the first and second
mortgages were established, the property was sold, and a deficiency
judgment was entered in favor of the present defendant against the
plaintiff for the amount of the second mortgage. There was no ap-
peal by plaintiff from the foreclosure proceedings nor from the order
wherein plaintiff's application to consolidate the present proceeding
with the foreclosure proceeding, was denied.
Thereafter the instant case came on to trial, and the jury brought
in a verdict of $4,265 for the plaintiff. The plaintiff's counsel then
moved for a determination of whether or not the jury's verdict in
this case took into consideration and eliminated the prior deficiency
judgment against plaintiff which defendant had secured in the fore-
closure proceeding. The trial judge held that since fraud was found
in the instant proceeding, the transaction on which the deficiency
judgment was based had been vitiated, and accordingly he ordered
that the deficiency judgment be satisfied and plaintiff's judgment in
the amount of $4,265 against the defendant be allowed to stand.
The defendant appealed this order to the Sfipreme Court which
held:
The trial judge clearly erred in holding that the verdict for
damages in a tort action for fraud and deceit vitiates any con-
tract which a purchaser has been fraudulently induced to enter.
It is true that a judgment in an action for rescission or to set
aside a transaction for fraud would ordinarily have that effect,
but the bringing of an action for damages for fraud and deceit
is an affirmation of the contract entitling the injured party, if
fraud is shown, to recover such damages in the tort action as
will compensate him for any loss sustained. It was upon this
theory that the instant case was tried .......... If the
trial judge felt that the verdict was inadequate, or against the
40. Turner v. Carey, 227 S.C. 298, 87 S.E. 2d 871 (1955).
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greater weight of the evidence, he was empowered to set it
aside and grant a new trial, but he could not invade the province
of the jury and substitute his verdict for theirs. (Omission
mine)
In Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company4' the de-
fendant appealed from the order of the lower court denying it
a new trial on the basis of excessive damages where the jury awarded
$50,000 actual and $15,000 punitive damages for the death of a
twelve year old boy. The Supreme Court held that although the
verdict was very large, it was not so excessive as to indicate that
the trial Judge abused his discretion in not granting a new trial. The
court held that it would not exercise its power to strike down the
judgment of the lower court except, "in those rare instances in
which the amount of the verdict is so shockingly excessive as mani-
festly to show that the jury was actuated by passion, partiality, pre-
judice, or corruption."
In Tackson v. Solomon42 defendant appealed from the award of
damages for injuries in an automobile collision which the trial
Judge had cut from $36,000 to $29,000 by order granting a new trial
nisi. In such order the judge had stated that the amount of the
verdict did not indicate caprice, prejudice, or passion.
The Supreme Court held that although it believed the verdict to
be high that it was not so excessive as to indicate prejudice, caprice,
passion, etc., such as to require that the Supreme Court set it aside
in toto and grant a new trial.
Review of Findings of Lower Court
In Seagle v. Montgomery43 the Court said:
The issue of title by adverse possession being one of law, our
factual review of it is limited to determination of whether there
was any evidence reasonably sustaining the judgment of the
lower Court.
In Frazier v. Frazier4 4 a divorce proceeding, the court held that
the finding of the trial Judge:
will not be disturbed unless it appears that such findings are
without evidenciary support or are against the clear preponder-
ance of the evidence.
41. Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E. 2d 830
(1955).
42. Jackson v. Solomon, 228 S.C. 225, 89 S.E. 2d 436 (1955).
43. Seagle v. Montgomery, 227 S.C. 436, 88 S.E. 2d 357 (1955).
44. Frazier v. Frazier, 228 S.C. 149, 89 S.E. 2d 225 (1955).
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It is the established law in this state that in an equity case,
this Court may reverse the findings of fact of a Circuit Judge
or a Judge of a county Court, when the appellant satisfies this
Court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the find-
ing of the lower Court.
The court has held that findings of a master concurred in by a Cir-
cuit Judge are not reviewable in a law case if there is evidence to
sustain them, but are reviewable in an equity case where such find-
ings are against the clear preponderance of the evidence. Carolina
Savings Bank v. Ellis.45 Thus in the first instance the court may
look only to see whether there is any evidence to sustain the findings,
but in the second instance it may go further and weigh the evidence
making its own finding despite evidence to the contrary.
In South Orange Trust Company v. Conner46 the Supreme Court
refused to set aside the finding of the referee concurred in by the
Circuit Judge that appellant was not an innocent purchaser for value
of the note and mortgage which it sought to foreclose, on the ground
that there was ample evidence to sustain such findings. Also in Max-
well v. Smith,47 the Supreme Court held that the preponderance of
the evidence sustained the concurrent findings of Master and Cir-
cuit Judge as to respondent's alleged laches and therefore such find-
ings would not be disturbed on review. See also Graves v. DuBose
48
where the Supreme Court declined to set aside concurrent findings
of Master and Circuit Judge in a case where the plaintiff brought
ejectment proceedings against the defendant who resisted on the
ground that he was her common law husband.
Review Where Objections Not Timely Made
In Goolsby v. Goolsby49 the Supreme Court observed:
Incidentally, an objection to testimony taken by a referee
(Master) must be made before him, as it was in this case, it
comes too late if first made by exception to his report. [Citing
Tompkins v. Tompkins, 18 S.C. 1 (1882) ; Cardwell v. Brewer,
19 S.C. 602 (1883)].
Review of Points Not Raised Below
The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that issues not raised
or argued before the lower court could not be considered on appeal
45. Carolina Savings Bank v. Ellis, 174 S.C. 69, 176 S.E. 355 (1934).
46. South Orange Trust Co. v. Conner, 228 S.C. 218, 89 S.E. 2d 372 (1955).
47. Maxwell v. Smith, 228 S.C. 182, 89 S.E. 2d 280 (1955).
48. Graves v. DuBose, 229 S.C. 123, 92 S.E. 2d 134 (1916).
49. Goolsby v. Goolsby, 229 S.C. 101, 92 S.E. 2d 57 (1956).
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by the Supreme Court except matters relating to jurisdiction. Reno
v. Manufacturers and Jobbers Finance Corporation50 .
Thus in an appeal by the defendant from the order of the lower
court denying it additional time in which to answer, the Supreme
Court in the case of Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Com-
pany5 ' refused to consider the applicability of a statute doubling the
time where service is made by mail for the reason that the appellant
had not raised or argued the applicability of the statute before the
lower court.
However in Maxwell v. Smith52 the appellant for the first time on
his appeal to the Supreme Court questioned the jurisdiction of the
Richland County Court to enjoin him from the violation of certain
restrictive covenants on real estate. The Supreme Court held:
It is of course immaterial that the jurisdictional issue was not
raised in the lower Court, for it is elementary that the trial
Court's jurisdiction of the subject matter may be questioned
for the first time upon appeal. But we find no merit in appel-
lant's contention here.
The court then decided that the monetary limitation imposed on the
Richland County Court did not effect its jurisdiction in cases such as
that.
Waiver of Objection
In Wright v. Gilbert5 3 plaintiff brought suit for false imprison-
ment against defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court declined
to rule whether or not the lower court erred in admitting certain testi-
mony as to plaintiff's state of mind, on the grounds that the defen-
dants by cross examining on the subject without reservation of their
objection, and also by introducing evidence thereon had waived their
objection to the testimony.
In another case, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the
question of whether or not the parties had waived their objection to
the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. In H. S. Chisholm,
Incorporated v. Klinger,54 the Supreme Court, affirming the lower
court's holding that it had jurisdiction of the defendants, said:
There is another compelling reason to sustain the lower Court.
50. Reno v. Manufacturers, etc., Finance Corp., 222 S.C. 401, 73 S.E. 2d
277 (1952).
51. Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 229 S.C. 44, 91 S.E.
2d 723 (1956).
52. Maxwell v. Smith, 228 S.C. 182, 89 S.E. 2d 280 (1955).
53. Wright v. Gilbert, 227 S.C. 334, 88 S.E. 2d 72 (1955).
54. H. S. Chisholm, Inc. v. Klinger, 229 S.C. 8, 91 S.R. 2d 538 (1956).
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'A voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to personal
service of the summons upon him.' Code 10-406.1. As the
above advertences to the record show, appellants first appeared
to contest the jurisdiction of the Court because service upon them
was outside of the State. Upon the overruling of that and
reference to the Master they appeared before him, partici-
pated generally in the reference without reservation, and con-
tested the action on the merits, moved to dismiss on the merits,
and thereafter belatedly made the presently argued point that
they should have been served with summons rather than Rule
to Show Cause. The question of jurisdiction of their persons
was waived by appellants under all of these circumstances.
The court went on to hold that the appellants had utterly failed
to conform to the procedure required of a defendant who would pre-
serve a jurisdictional question after adverse ruling upon it, citing
CODM or LAWS Or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-648 et seq. See
also, South Carolina State Highway Department v. Isthmian S. S.
Co. 55
In Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Chandler56 the Supreme Court
held that the defendant resident of Richland County did not waive
his right to move for change of venue to the County of his residence
because he had previously consented that the place of venue be fixed
by the Court in Greenville County at a time when a resident of
Greenville County was a co-defendant. When the Greenville resi-
dent was eliminated as a co-defendant the Supreme Court held that
it was proper for the Richland County defendant to move for change
of venue to Richland County.
Where the answer alleged plaintiff was a wealthy man and plain-
tiff had not moved to strike such allegation, the Supreme Court held
in Shea v. Glens Falls Indentity Co.57 that plaintiff waived his right
to object to the trial court's admission of testimony on the subject.
The court held that if appellant conceived it improper that evidence
be admitted as to his wealth, he should have availed himself of the
remedy provided by CODE ov LAWS Or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952
§ 10-606, providing: "If irrelevant or redundant matter be inserted
in a pleading it may be stricken out on motion of any person aggrieved
thereby." The Court held:
55. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Isthmian S. S. Co., 210
S.C. 408, 43 S.E. 2d 132 (1947).
56. Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Chandler, 228 S.C. 412, 90 S.E. 2d 489
(1955).
57. Shea v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 228 S.C. 173, 89 S.E. 2d 221 (1950).
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The appellant is not now in position to complain that the evi-
dence introduced concerning his wealth was objectionable, he
having made no motion to strike this allegation from the answer.
This court has in numerous cases held that it is not error to
admit testimony in support of irrelevant allegations where there
is no motion to strike out such allegations ...
Dismissal of Appeal
In Pee Dee Farms Corporation v. Johnson5 8 defendant, after hav-
ing served Notice of Intention to Appeal from an Order directing
a verdict for the plaintiff, failed to perfect Appeal. Plaintiff moved
before the Circuit Judge to dismiss the Appeal, and the Appeal was
dismissed. The Supreme Court said:
It is unquestionable that under the rules of the Circuit Court
and of this Court, that the Court below had jurisdiction to en-
tertain motions to dismiss where the noticed Appeal had not
been perfected. (The Court then cited certain statutes and de-
cisions) . . . the last named case holding that where a case
and exceptions are not filed as required by Rule 49 of the Cir-
cuit Court, that the Circuit Court should dismiss the Appeal.
See also, McDonald v. Palmetto Theatres, 196 S.C. 38, 11
S.R. 2d 444, to the effect that after an Appeal is perfected and
docketed under Rule 1 of this Court, the Circuit Court's juris-
diction ceases, the implication being clearly that before perfec-
tion and docketing the circuit court has jurisdiction.
58. Pee Dee Farms v. Johnson, 227 S.C. 396, 88 S.E. 2d 254 (1955).
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